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By means of a simple simulation model we will look at the effect of the General Old Age
Pensions Act on the distribution of lifetime income in the Netherlands. In spite of the fact that
premiums are proportional to income, whereas benefits are only dependent on marital status
(married or unmarried), I the redistribution of income is rather limited. This is especially true for
the vertical income redistribution within a generation. This is caused by differences in mortality
rates and differences in the duration of working life between income groups.
1. Introduction
The aim of this paper is to study the influence of the Dutch General Old
Age Pensions Act (GOAPA) on the distribution of lifetime income. This is
done for the birth-generations 1905 to 1965 and for different income groups.
The research in this field is mainly theoretical [see, for example, Kessler
and Masson (1985), Keyfitz (1985), Verbon (1985), Layard (1977), Castellino
(1971), Atkinson (1970) and Prest (1970)]. In most cases assumptions such as
a stable population, no intergenerational transfers, and so on, are made. This
means that the results are not relevant for present generations. To obtain
insight into the redistributive aspects of the GOAPA for present generations,
we develop a simulation model. Before doing so, we give a description of the
GOAPA system in the Netherlands. We then state our assumptions in
section 3. The model is presented in section 4 and the results are set out in
section 5. Section 6 discusses the effects of some of the assumptions, while
section 7 contains a summary and ends with some conclusions.
2. The General Old Age Pensions Act in the Netherlands
Since 1 January 1957, the General Old Age Pensions Act has insured all
*The author wishes to thank Prof. Dr. G.F. Frinking, Dr. J. Bartlema and an anonymous
referee for their comments on an earlier draft. The research was carried out in the framework of
the project entitled 'Problems relating to the distribution of social security".
I An unmarried person gets 70% of the amount received by a married couple.
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residents between the ages of 15 and 65 and has provided an old age pension
from the age of 65. The GOAPA is financed by means of the pay-as-you-go
system. The premium has to be paid by those insured, roughly speaking the
people aged between 15 and 65. The premium is a percentage of the so-called
premium income? (11.65% in 1984) and is levied up to ' the so-called
maximum premium income or contribution limit (011.62,850 in 1984). For
those who were over 15 years of age in 1957, when the GOAPA came into
operation, temporary provisions were made. For persons born before 1
January 1942, but after 1 January 1892, the law provides that for the period
between the moment they reached the age of 15 years and the moment the
law came into force they are considered (under certain conditions) as being
insured. Another temporary provision grants the right to a GOAPA benefit
to persons who on 1 January 1957 had already reached the age of 65 and
who have never been insured under this law.
Unlike the premiums, benefits are calculated on a l1at-rate basis. At first it
was a basic pension but the net benefit has been increased over the years to
the same level as the net minimum wage, at least for married couples.
Unmarried people receive 70% of the benefit a couple gets. In 1984 the benefit
for a married couple amounted to 011. 19,734 gross per annum and for an
unmarried person 011.13,761. Before 1 April 1985 married women could not
generally claim benefit. Their claims were included in those of their hus-
bands. As from 1 April 1985 all people reaching the age of 65 will receive a
benefit, with only a few exceptions. For a married person the benefit will be
50% of the amount that a married couple receives. When the partner of the
person in question is younger than 65 years old, then he or she will receive a
supplement. From 1 April 1988 this supplement will be dependent on the
income of the partner.
Another change introduced in 1985 is that husband and wife have to pay,
each separately, the GOAPA premium up to the maximum premium income.
Before 1985 the premium incomes of husband and wife were taken together
and the GOAPA premium was levied on this sum (up to the maximum
premium income). For partners who both have a high income, this change
means that they have to pay twice as much as before 1985.
So the structure of the General Old Age Pensions Act implies the
following redistributional aspects:
(1) Because of the fact that the GOAPA is financed by the pay-as-you-go
2The premium income is the income on which the premiums are levied. The following figures
for the year 1984 give the premium income for different levels of the gross income or of the
profit earned by self-employed people after deduction of stocks and 'old age reserves', but before
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19,170 28,t4O 36,465 42,365 50,205 58,452 62,850
13,330 22,464 31,205 39,945 48,686 57,426 62,850
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system, the specific premium percentages are dependent on the population
structure, so that changes in this structure lead to intergenerational transfers.
Because of the ageing of the Dutch population this aspect is very important
in the Netherlands.
(2) Before the revision of the law in 1985 couples had to pay premiums up
to the (individual) maximum premium income; the same applied to single
persons. For the latter the benefit is 70% of a couple's benefit. This, in
combination with the level of the maximum premium income, implies a
redistribution from unmarried to married people.
(3) The differences in mortality rates between men and women cause a
redistribution from men to women.
(4) The temporary provisions (made in 1957) favour the generations born
before 1942, especially those born around 1905.
Another relevant point is the fact that death rates differ between income
groups. From the little information and literature available on death rates
differentiated by income, it appears that these death rates are considerably
higher for low-income groups than for high-income groups. From the studies
by van Poppel (1978), Desplanques (1984), and Koskinen (1985) it appears
that differences of 6 to 8 years for men and about 4 years for women are
reasonable. This means that persons in higher income groups receive their
GOAPA benefit for more years than persons in the lower income groups.
Moreover, the age at which a person starts working will, generally
speaking (as a result of a longer period of education), be lower for the lower
income groups than for the higher ones, so that the number of years a
person pays GOAPA premiums will be higher for the lower income groups.
3. Assumptions of the model
(1) In the first place we assume that in the long run the income in year
t-v k (Y(t+k)) is determined by the income in year t (Y(t)) and by the growth
rate of the income (IV) in the following way:
t+k-!
Y(t+k)= Y(t)· Il (1 +w(j)), k>O.
j=t
(1)
We have taken the average gross income in the metallurigical industry for
male manual workers between 15 and 65 years of age" to determine the
growth rate of the income. This income has been chosen because it is the
only relevant information available for the lengthy period under
consideration.
(2) The next assumption we make is that the discount rate (the time
preference) r(t) for the past will be equal to the average interest rate of new
JSource: Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (1979) and (1983).
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mortgage loans." For the period 1910-1983 the difference between this
interest rate and the applied annual income growth rate (w) is equal to 0.56%
per annum on average. During the last few decades the average difference
between the two has been slightly over 1% a year. For this reason we
consider three variants for this difference ((I +w(t))j(1 +r(t))) in the future: 0,
1 and 2% (subvariants a, band c, respectively).
(3) Furthermore, we assume for the future that the GOAPA benelits will





Because of the link with the minimum wage and the lirst assumption, this
assumption is quite logical.
(4) We apply the most recent life table (that for 1982) to all birth-
generations." The reason for this is that it is not possible to foresee the
development in mortality patterns very far into the twenty-first century. We
therefore use the same life table for all generations. We also assume that
there are no differences in"mortality by marital status.
(5) Because we do not know the income of aged couples in which one
partner is younger than 65 and because we do not know the distribution of
differences in age between married partners, we assume the maximum
possible supplement. This means that married couples get 100% of the benelit
for aged couples, from the moment the husband reaches the age of 65.6 We
assume that in a married couple the husband is on average 2.5 years older
than his wife.? By means of the study by Koesoebjono (1981) and the
Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (1984) we can calculate the average
number of years lived in each state (married, widowed or divorced) for
couples in which the husband is 65 years old. These couples live on average
11.9 years in the married state, the husband is widowed for 2.0 years on
average and the wife for 8.7 years. Their average expectancy in the divorced
state is 0.1 years.
(6) We assume that there will be no marriage or re-marriage after the age
of 65.
(7) In the main variant we suppose that the 1945 and 1950 birth-
generations pay their premiums from the age of 15, whereas the following
generations pay from the age of 20.
"Source: Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (1979) and (1983).
5See Tas (1984).
61n 1981 there were about 500,000 married men of 65 years and older. These men had 46,600
working spouses. The mean income of these working spouses was Dn.5,OOO. So the numbers and
the incomes are very small.
'This assumption is based on the results of the study by Frinking and van Poppel (1979).
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(8) In doing the calculations we assume that the income is constant during
working life (for example DO. 30,(00). In practice this is of course not the
case: the income-age profile is not a straight line; in the first years of
working life the income will grow (up to the age of 40/45), especially in the
first years of working life. From the age of 40/45 to 55/59 we generally see a
stabilization and after the age of 55/59 we note a slight decline,
4. The derivation of the net GOAPA result
In this section we derive the formula for the expected net GOAPA result
at age 65. The net GOAPA result is defined as the difference between the
expected sum total of GOAPA benefits from the age of 65 onwards and the
expected sum total of GOAPA contributions up to age 65.
For a person born in the year t-x with a premium income below the
maximum, we can say, on the basis of assumptions (I) and (2), that the
contribution for the GOAPA premium at age x (14<x<65), discounted to
the year t1 (PAY(x,t,t 1», is:
1.-1









prGOAPA(t) is the GOAPA premium percentage in the year t (see appendix B),
Y(tl) is the income in the year t 1 [see assumption (I)],
r(j) is the discount rate,
\.r(j) is the income growth rate.
If t < 1957, we take prGOAPA(t) =0.
For the expected benefit from the GOAPA at age x (x> 64), also discounted
to the year t1 (BEN(x, t, t1»,we get:
1.-1





if t 1 <t,
(4)





if t l < 1982, then YI(tI) = Y(tI)
where
1(X) is the chance that a person born in the year t - x is still alive
in the year t,
GOAPA(t I) is the level of the GOAPA benefit in the year t i .
The net result of the payments and the benefits will then be
00 64
NETGOAPA(t,t I)= I BEN(x,t,t I)- I PAY(x,t,tI)· (5)
x=6S x=IS
Formula (5) also holds for persons who were older than 65 years in the year
t, but had not reached this age on 31 January 1957. For persons born before
31 January 1892, the formula also applies, but prGOAPA(t l) is zero for all
years.
The above-mentioned formulas are applicable, as we stated earlier, on
condition that Y(tI) is not higher than the maximum premium income. In
that case we have to take the relevant maximum premium income instead of
Y(t I)'
However, there is one problem. Assumption (2) holds only for the period
after 1972. Since that year the level of the GOAPA benefit has developed in
accordance with the net minimum wage. For this reason we have to apply a
correction factor for t < 1973. These correction factors arc given in appendix A.
A similar problem occurs with the maximum premium income. On average
this maximum premium income increases uniformly with the income itself. In
1982, however, the maximum premium income was increased disproportion-
ately. As a result we have to use a correction factor for the period before
1982 in our calculations for t l > 1981 in order to compensate for this increase
in the maximum premium income. This correction factor is equal to 0.85.
Taking these corrections and the maximum age (109) into account, we get
the following general formula:
109 64
NETGOAPA(t,td= I BEN(x,t,tI)'CI(t)- I PAY(x,t,t I), (6)
x=6S x=IS
where
Y(t I) in PAY(j, t, t I) has to be replaced by YI(t 1);
if t l > 1981, then YI(t1)= Y(t 1) if Y(t I) < C2' Ymax(t l), t < 1982 or
if Y(tl)<Ymax(tI)' t>1981,
if Y(tI)> =C I' Ymax(tI), t< 1982,
if Y(tI» = Ymax(t I), t> 1981;
if Y(tI)< Ymax(tI) or
if Y(tI)<Ymax(tI)/C2, t>1981,
if Y(tI» = Ymax(tI), t< 1982,
if Y(tI» = Ymax(td/C2' t> 1981,
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in which
is the correction factor for the level of the GOAPA benefits; c1(t) = 1
for t> 1972; for the period before 1973, see appendix A,
is the correction factor for the maximum premium income,
is the maximum premium income in the year t.
In the next section we use this formula to compute the expected net result of
the General Old Age Pensions Act for different birth-generations.
5. The results
In this section we calculate the expected net result of the General Old Age
Pensions Act by means of formula (6). In other words we calculate the
difference between expected received benefits and expected paid premiums.
We do this for the 1905-1965 birth-generations, in which we distinguish
different household incomes (corrected for price inflation and real income
growth, in 1984 prices), ranging from Dfl.lO,OOO a year to the maximum
premium income of Dfl.62,850 (for unmarried people) and twice the maxi-
mum premium income (married couples in the basic variant). As we men-
tioned before, there are three subvariants: (1 + lI'(t»/( 1+r(t» = 0, 0.01 and
0.02, respectively, for the years 1984-2075 (subvariants a, b and c). For the
starting-year t, we take 1984. The relevant data is given in section 2. The
calculations are done for married couples and for people that were unmarried
at the age of 65.
In the first instance we do not take into account differences in mortality
rates between income groups. This is called the basic variant. The results are
given in appendix C, table Cl. We see that the expected net GOAPA result
in subvariant a is the highest for the 1905 generation. This generation paid
premiums for only a few years, but received a benefit from the moment they
were 65 years old. Depending on the level of the income, we see that the net
result decreases after 1905. Starting from 1935 (for unmarried people) and
1945 (married couples) the net result can be negative, dependent on the level
of the income: in other words, more premiums are paid during one's working
life than will be received as benefits. The net result is lower when the income
is higher (up to the maximum premium income). Next, we can conclude that,
when the income is the same (not counting couples born after 1920 for
whom the sum of the husband's and wife's combined income liable for
premium contributions is higher than Dfl.80,OOO), unmarried men have a
lower net result than married people and unmarried women. The difference
between unmarried men and unmarried women is caused by the difference in
life expectancy, whereas the difference between married and unmarried men
is caused by the difference in the level of the benefit to married and
unmarried persons, respectively. The expected sum from GOAPA benefits
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amounts to Dfl.384,830 for married couples, Dfll92,654 for unmarried men
and Df1254,579 for unmarried women (for generations after 1915). Thus, a
married couple in which the husband was born in 1965 and with an average
income during working life equal to the maximum premium income pay (for
the assumptions used) slightly over 1.25 times the amount that he may
. expect to receive. Unmarried men of that generation and with the same
income are likely to pay 2.4 times the amount that will be in store for the~
to receive, whereas unmarried women pay relatively less: 1.8 times the
expected benefit. For generations born after 1965 the net result will be even
more negative.
The decrease in the net result for generations born after 1941 (these
generations have to pay their premiums throughout the whole period of
insurance) is almost completely due to the influence of changes in the
structure of the population, particularly the relative increase in the number
of people older than 65, in relation to the number of people between 15 and
64 years old." As a consequence, the development in the net result is very
clear: a significant decrease since 1945, especially in the higher income
groups. As a result of the further increase of this ratio the net result for
subsequent birth-generations will be lower yet. No change can be expected
within the next few decades.
The law amendment of 1 April 1985-means that married people have to
pay premiums based on their income, each up to the maximum premium
income. As a result, households in which husband and wife have to pay more
than the maximum (individual) premium income contribute more to the
GOAPA system than before. The added premium contributions can be
derived from table Cl: this is the difference between the net result of the
premium income on which premium has to be paid after 1 April 1985 and
the net result which results from an income equal to the maximum premium
income (Ofl.62,850). If a married couple in which the husband was born in
1955 have to pay the premium on an income of Dfl.90,000 starting on the
above-mentioned date, then the net result is - Dfl. 140,000. If the law had
not been changed, the net result would be - Dfl. 70,000. We thus have a
6555453525
BThe number of people aged 15 to 64 years in relation to the number of people aged 65 or
older is given below for some generations and ages.
~ Age 15
Generation~
1905 no GOAPA 6.8 6.2
1915 contributions 6.8 6.2 5.8
1925 6.8 6.2 5.8 5.4
1935 6.8 6.2 5.8 5.4 5.0
1945 6.8 6.2 5.8 5.4 5.0 4.5
1955 6.2 5.8 5.4 5.0 4.5 3.4
1965 5.8 5.4 5.0 4.5 3.4 2.7
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Table 1
The premium percentage at which the expected net result is equal for everyone;
difTerences in mortality rates and the duration of working life are not taken into
account (basic variant).
Premium income
20 30 40 50 60 62.850"
Married couples 34.9 23.3 17.5 .14.0 11.6 11.1
Never married men 17.2 11.5 8.6 6.9 5.7 5.5
Never married women 25.7 17.1 12.8 10.3 8.6 8.2
Premium income
70 80 90 100 110 120 125.7
Married couples 10.0 8.7 7.8 7.0 6.4 5.8 5.6
"For incomes above Dfl, 62,850 the same premium percentage applies as for Dfl.
62,850 for unmarried people.
decrease of more than Of1.120,000. It must be pointed out that the number
of people that will be affected by this measure is relatively insignificant: less
than 3% of married couples have a premium income above Ofl.62,850.
If we take into account subvariants band c, the picture becomes less
transparent. The maximum expected result is also dependent upon the
income: for married people with an income of Ofl.20,000 and less, the
maximum expected result in subvariant b is achieved by the youngest
generation, whereas for married people with an income of Ofl.30,000 and
more the maximum is achieved by the oldest generations. The picture
changes only slightly in the case of unmarried people: only when the income
is Dfl. 10,000 does the youngest generation have the maximum net result.
When we look at subvariant c we see a further shift in the maximum net
result towards the younger generations. For married people born in 1965,
only people with an income of more than Ofl.60,000 fail to achieve the
maximum result. For unmarried people, too, there is a shift in the maximum
net result from the older to the younger generations, at least for lower
Incomes.
Because of the fact that there is a real income growth in cases band c, the
net result is higher for everyone, but in both subvariants the net result for
unmarried men is the lowest, whereas the net result for married couples is
the highest.
In the foregoing we did not take into account differences in mortality rates
between income groups or the duration of working life. This is not very
realistic. We shall therefore now look at the results of two alternative
variants. The results of subvariant a are shown in tables C2 and C3 of
appendix C. Variant A uses an average difference in expected lifetime
between the highest and the lowest income group of 8 (men), and 4 years
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(women), respectively. In variant B this difference is 4 and 2 years, respec-
tively. Concerning the average number of years worked, we assume that the
difference between the highest and the lowest income group is 7 years.
A comparison of tables C2 and C3 with table Cl clearly shows that the
redistribution of lifetime income is much smaller than was at first suggested.
Notable is the fact that for the 1905 and 1915 generations and to a lesser
extent some younger birth-generations, the net result increases with income
under the conditions of variant A. This relationship is even more pronounced
where the difference in growth between the wage rate and the interest rate is
higher. Hence, it is most apparent in subvariant c, where we take into
consideration the fact that the GOAPA system made lifetime incomes more
unequal up to the year 1972. We shall return to this topic later.
This phenomenon also becomes clear in another way: tables 1, 2 and 3








20 30 40 50 60 62.850"
28.0 20.9 17.9 16.2 15.2 14.6
10.6 8.4 8.8 8.7 8.7 8.4
21.6 15.7 13.1 11.7 10.8 10.3
Premium income
70 80 90 100 110 120 125.7
13.1 11.4 10.2 9.2 8.3 7.6 7.3
"For incomes above Dfl, 62,850 the same premium percentage applies as for Dfl,








20 30 40 50 60 62.850"
30.7 21.9 17.9 15.6 14.2 13.5
13.5 10.2 8.8 8.0 7.6 7.3
23.1 16.2 13.1 11.3 10.2 9.7
Premium income
70 80 90 100 110 120 125.7
12.2 10.6 9.5 8.5 7.7 7.1 6.8
"For incomes above Dfl. 62,850 the same premium percentage applies as for Dfl,
62,850 for unmarried people.
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concerned if the sum of the expected net result is to be equal for everyone
(people born after 1942 only). In the (fictitious) case that the growth of the
wage rate is equal to the interest rate, this means that the sum of the
contributions equals the sum of the expected GOAPA benefits.
The interpretation is quite simple: for example, in variant A in the case of
a married couple with a household premium income of Dfl.20,000, if the
GOAPA premium percentage is continuously 28.0%, the net result of
expected contributions and benefits equals the net result for an unmarried
man with an income of Dfl.60,000 when this man is paying a premium
percentage of 8.7, and in this case an intergenerational redistribution would
not be necessary. Table 1, which relates to the (probably not realistic)
assumption that there are no differences in death rates and in years worked
between the income groups, suggests that there is a large redistribution of
lifetime income from higher to lower income groups. In this case married
people in the lowest income groups pay far too little (the resulting percentage
of 34.9% is much higher than the premium percentage that was applied in
1984) and the highest income group pays far too much.
If, on the other hand, we take into account differences in mortality rates
and differences in the duration of working life between the income groups,
then we can put on record that the distributive effect of the GOAPA system
is less striking than initially suggested. The differences between the two
variants (A and B) are rather small.
Vertical income transfers within the same generation mainly take place
between married people and between unmarried women. Within the popu-
lation of unmarried men there is no significant vertical redistribution: only
the lowest income group receives some profit. It is noticeable that the
percentages that apply to an income of more than Dfl.40,000 (and for
unmarried women as little as Dfl.20,OOO) show little variation.
Horizontal distributive effects are more pronounced: a considerable income
transfer is manifest from unmarried people to married couples, with unmarried
men contributing more than unmarried women. Within a generation these
horizontal transfers are larger than the vertical income transfers.
A consequence of the current premium percentage (11.65%) is that
unmarried women with an income of up to Dfl.40,000 and married couples
with a premium income of up to Dfl.70,000 pay comparatively too little
premium and the other categories pay comparatively too much. For married
people the current system is definitely advantageous, and this group in
particular shows a distinct difference from the situation where differences in
mortality rates between income groups are considered as being absent. About
the year 2000, when the premium percentage will probably be between 14
and 15%, married people with an income of up to Dfl.55,000 and unmarried
women with an income of up to Dfl.25,000 will be the only groups that
make a relative 'profit' from the system.
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This indicates another horizontal income transfer, namely from younger
generations to older generations. This horizontal redistribution is caused by
the way the system is financed (the pay-as-you-go system) and developments
in the demographic field (see footnote 8). The fact that present-day premium
percentages are relatively too low for the majority of the population also
means an extra burden in the future on the shoulders of the younger
generation, since for example the insufficient amount that is paid by married
couples now will have to be counterbalanced by other generations later.
In view of the small differences in the premium percentages, it is true to
say that for married couples with a premium income of between approxi-
mately Ofl.40,OOO and Ofl.70,000 the GOAPA system at the moment
equalizes the lifetime incomes only in a very modest way. It seems, indeed,
rather as if at the present-day premium percentages the system makes
lifetime incomes more unequal within the above-mentioned groups (see the
results for the older generations in table C2). This is particularly true for the
years before 1972, when the GOAPA premium percentage was less than 10%.
In that period the payment deficit was larger for the higher income groups
than for the lower income groups!
Summarizing, we can say that the vertical income transfers are compara-
tively less significant than our first calculations suggested. In this instance we
did not take account of differences in mortality rates and duration of
working life. Horizontal income transfers playa more important role within
the same generation. There are extensive transfers from the unmarried to the
married. Clearly, the system expects more solidarity from unmarried people
with regard to married people than from higher income groups with regard
to lower income groups. There is also an important intergenerational
solidarity caused by the fact that the majority of people (especially the
married ones) pay too little premium. This leads to an extensive transfer
from younger to older generations.
6. The effects of the assumptions in section 3
The first assumption, that in the long run the development of the income
follows the development of the average gross income in the metallurgical
industry, will probably not completely hold for higher incomes in the past.
It is unlikely that these incomes experienced proportional growth. The
consequence of this is that the contributions that have been paid are over-
estimated for the higher incomes, so that the net GOAPA result is under-
estimated. This means that the vertical redistribution will be still less than we
have seen in section 5.
The second and the third assumptions require no further explanation. The
third assumption received ample treatment in section 4, where the correction
factor Cl was discussed.
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The application of the same life table to all birth-generations leads to a
slight overestimation of the net result for the older generations. Although the
future is not foreseeable, it is very likely that the use of this life table
underestimates the life expectancy of the younger generations, so that their
net result will be underestimated. At this point we should observe that when
the life expectancy of the younger generations rises gradually, the contri-
butions for these generations will also be higher. Thus, the intergenerational
redistribution from younger to older generations will be somewhat less, but
not so much as to seriously affect the results of section 5 relating to this
question.
In practice there are some differences in mortality rates differentiated by
marital status: married people have a longer life expectancy than unmarried
people. If these differences are ignored, the (horizontal) income redistribution
from unmarried to married people is to some extent underestimated.
Assumption (5) leads to a small overestimation of the net GOAPA result
for married couples (born after 1920), because of the fact that a number of
partners (of an aged person) younger than 65 have incomes of their own,
which implies that supplements will not be paid in full or even at all. Which
in turn means that their net GOAPA result will be lower than estimated. As
a consequence the horizontal redistribution from the unmarried to the
married is overestimated.
The assumption that there will be no marriage or re-marriage after the age
of 65 underestimates the net result for unmarried people. We do not have
enough information on the real age at which people start their work careers
for sensible comment. The increase in this age will be more gradual than is
assumed here. What the distributional effects will be is not known.
As a consequence of the fact that the period during which the income is
less than the mean income during working life is shorter than the period
during which the income is greater, the lower premiums paid during the first
period will be offset by the higher premiums paid later on (this is also caused
by the increase in the GOAPA premium percentages, especially in the next
century). So, assumption (8) induces an overestimation of the vertical
beneficial effect of the pension scheme: the contribution will be larger
according as the income is higher. Also, the underestimation of the contri-
bution is larger for the younger generations than for the older ones.
However, the consequences are rather limited and the general conclusions are
not affected.
Summing up, we feel confident that the conclusions arrived at in section 5
retain their validity and even find further support from our analysis of the
potential bias inherent in the assumptions. The horizontal redistribution
from unmarried to married people is probably larger, whereas the vertical
redistribution will be less than was apparent from the calculations. This
confirms the importance of the horizontal redistribution. The intergener-
ational redistribution will be slightly smaller than was initially suggested.
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7. Summary and conclusions
By means of some assumptions concerning the correlation between the
long-term development of income and interest rates, the development of the
level of GOAPA benefits, mortality rates, the age differences :between
husbands and wives, divorce and (re-)marriage after the age of 65, and the
relation between income and age, we have derived a formula for the net
GOAPA result of a birth generation [formula (6)].
By using a single life table and doing the calculations both for married
couples (in which the wife lives longer than the husband) and unmarried men
and women, we have incorporated the effect of institutional factors on the
net GOAPA result of birth-generations.
All generations that were older than 15 on 1 January 1957 profited from
the temporary provisions that applied at the moment the law came into
effect. Depending on the subvariant, the 1905 and 1965 birth-generations
have the highest net result. The way the benefits are financed (the 'pay-as-
you-go'-system) induces, as a result of the changes in the structure of the
population,a continued lower net result (when w(t)=r(t)). The 1985 change
in the law affects in a very negative way the net result of married couples in
which husband and wife have a (rather) high income.
Using the results in appendix tables C2 and C3 and tables 1, 2 and 3 in
the text, we went into the case of the effect of differences in death rates and
differences in the duration of working life between income groups. The
importance of the differences in mortality rates is very clear. Unfortunately,
there are not enough data in the Netherlands to draw exact conclusions. But
it is clear that despite the fact that the premium is levied as a percentage of
income, the effect of the GOAPA system on the redistribution of lifetime
incomes is much less than one is apt to think in the first instance. In
particular, the vertical income redistribution, i.e. the redistribution between
different income groups, is rather limited (especially for the same generation).
So, for married people with an income of between Df!.40,000 and
Dfl. 70,000 the GOAPA system (at least up to 1972) increased the inequality
in lifetime income! The income transfers between the different income groups
on a lifetime basis are apparently much less than is suggested by the analysis
of data that covers a limited period."
Within the GOAPA system solidarity between income groups of the same
generation is rather limited. More solidarity is expected from unmarried
people, especially unmarried men. There are substantial income transfers from
this group to married people. In addition, an intergenerational solidarity
effect is observed in terms of the net transfers from the young to the old.
Another important conclusion was that up to 1985 the majority of the
population was contributing relatively too little to avoid intergenerational
"Sec, Cor example, Muffels, Nelissen and Nuyens (1986).
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redistributions as well, especially married people. This is an important cause
of the increase of the burden in the future. Today's insufficient contributions
will have to be compensated for at a later date. As a result of demographic
developments this extra money will have to be furnished by fewer people.
The government would be well advised to perceive this as a reality for its
policy. An increase of the GOAPA premium percentage up to the percentage
that is minimally necessary to cover the financial needs of a generation
(about 13.5% in the Dutch case) is the least that can be done. However, a
consequence of this would be that the purely pay-as-you-go system would be
partly abandoned.
This example of the Dutch situation contains some elements that are also
important for other countries in Western Europe. The most important one
will probably be the development of the premium percentages in the future.
Appendix B shows that in the situation of a stagnating population growth
the pay-as-you-go system for old age pensions leads to very high premium
percentages after some decades. In a situation of declining population (the
Netherlands after the year 2(05) the percentages reach such high levels that
the premium will probably be unpayable. The opposite will happen if the
population growth rate shows a gradual increase. In this case the pay-as-
you-go system implies that people pay too 'little' a contribution.
With respect to income policy, we come to the interesting conclusion that
the vertical redistribution in pay-as-you-go old age pensions is rather limited
in a lifetime, whereas horizontal transfers from the unmarried to the married
play an important role. Hence, the system implies solidarity claims, but in
practice these are different from what was intended: not so much from the
rich to the poor as from the unmarried to the married.
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Appendix A: Correction factors C1(t1) for the level of the GOAPA
benefit
Table Al

















Note: The correction factor is calculated as
the quotient of the level of the GOAPA
benefit and the net minimum wage in 1972,
corrected by. the price-index figure for na-
tional income.
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Appendix B: Premium percentages pursuant to the GOAPA; 1957-1984 and
projections for the period 1985-2030
Table Bl
Year' Percentage Year Percentage Year Percentage
1957 6.75 1967 8.8 1977 10.4
1958 6.75 1968 9.0 1978 10.45
1959 6.75 1969 9.1 1979 10.4
1960 5.5 1970 9.5 1980 10.25
1961 5.5 1971 9.9 1981 10.6
1962 5.75 1972 10.3 1982 11.05
1963 6.8 1973 10.4 1983 11.65
1964 6.8 1974 10.6 1984 11.65
1965 8.7 1975 10.4
1966 8.7 1976 10.4
1985 12 2005 15 2025 22
1990 13 2010 16 2030 23
1995 14 2015 18
2000 14 2020 20
'The intervening years are interpolated.
Note: It would be more correct to use the premium percentages
that result from the mortality table applied to all people born in the
past instead of the real percentages that, among other things, are
fixed as a result of actual death rates. But, because the changes in
the death rates have a bearing on the younger ages, the deviations
that result from our method of calculation are very small.
Sources: Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, Sociale terzekering,
pensioenrerzekering, letensterzekering, Staatsuitgeverij, s-Gravenhage;
Europese Economische Gemeenschap Commissie, Verslag oter de
ontwikkeling !'an de sociaIe toestand in de Gemeenschap in 19",
Publiekatiediensten van de Europese Gemeenschappen; F.AJ. van
den Bosch, P.l.C. van Eekelen and C. Petersen, 'De toekomst van
de AOW: verdubbeling van de premies of halvering van de
uitkeringen?', Economisch Statistische Berichten 68, no. 3431, pp.
1052-1058.
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Appendix c: The expected net GOAPA result for the 1905-1965 birth-
generation at age 65 for different household incomes (corrected for price
inflation and real income increases; 1984 figures thousands of guilders).
Table Cl
Basic variant, subvariant a.
Income
Birth year 10 20 30 40 50 60 62.850
(a) Married couples
1905 414 407 399 392 384 381 381
1915 375 355 336 316 297 290 290
1925 353 321 289 258 226 208 206
1935 339 294 248 203 157 126 120
1945 326 267 208 149 90 44 33
1955 320 254 189 124 59 I -17
1965 311 236 162 88 14 -55 -82
Income
70 80 90 100 110 120 125.7
1925 221 229 209 202 196 190 187
1935 125 119 85 65 46 26 14
1945 28 7 -41 -76 -III -146 -166
1955 -35 -73 -140 -192 -245 -298 -327
1965 -115 -175 -263 -337 -412 -486 -528
Income
10 20 30 40 50 60 62.850
(b) Unmarried men
1905 211 203 196 188 180 178 178
1915 180 160 141 121 102 95 95
1925 161 129 97 65 34 16 14
1935 147 102 56 II -35 -67 -73
1945 134 75 16 -43 -102 -140 -159
1955 127 62 -3 -68 -134 -191 -209
1965 118 44 -30 -104 -178 -257 -274
(c) Unmarried women
1905 273 265 258 250 242 249 240
1915 242 222 203 183 164 157 157
1925 223 191 159 127 96 78 76
1935 209 164 118 73 27 -5 -11
1945 196 137 78 18 -41 -86 -97
1955 189 124 59 -6 -72 -129 -147
1965 180 106 32 -42 -116 -185 -212
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Subvariant b
Income
Birth year 10 20 30 40 50 60 62.850
(a) Married couples
1905 417 410 402 394 387 384 384
1915 398 378 359 339 289 270 268
1925 417 385 353 321 289 270 268
1935 448 401 354 307 259 226 220
1945 483 419 355 291 227 175 164
1955 528 451 374 298 221 149 131
1965 571 475 378 282 186 89 62
Income
70 80 90 100 110 120 125.7
1925 289 301 276 270 264 257 254
1935 232 231 189 167 146 124 112
1945 166 148 86 46 6 -33 -56
1955 119 80 -9 -73 -137 -201 -238
1965 31 -39 -162 -259 -355 -452 -507
Income
10 20 30 40 50 60 62.850
(b) Unmarried men
1905 211 203 196 188 180 178 178
1915 186 167 147 128 108 101 101
1925 186 154 122 90 58 40 38
1935 194 147 100 52 5 -29 -35
1945 202 138 74 10 -54 -106 -117
1955 218 141 64 -13 -89 -161 -179
1965 229 132 36 -61 -157 -254 -281
(c) Unmarried women
1905 274 266 259 251 243 241 241
1915 256 236 217 197 178 171 171
1925 263 231 199 167 135 117 115
1935 279 232 185 137 90 56 50
1945 296 232 168 104 40 -12 -23
1955 321 245 168 91 14 -57 -76
1965 343 247 150 54 -43 -139 -167
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Subvariant c
Income
Birth year 10 20 30 40 50 60 62.850
(a) Married couples
1905 420 412 405 397 390 387 387
1915 423 404 384 365 345 339 339
1925 491 459 427 395 363 344 342
1935 589 540 491 442 393 357 351
1945 708 638 568 497 427 370 357
1955 857 766 675 583 492 406 383
1965 1029 902 775 648 521 394 358
Income
70 80 90 100 110 120 125.7
1925 370 387 357 350 344 337 333
1935 374 379 327 303 280 256 243
1945 372 362 280 234 188 143 116
1955 386 351 229 150 71 -7 -52
1965 339 265 85 - 42 -169 - 296 -368
Income
10 20 30 40 50 60 62.850
(b) Unmarried men
1905 211 203 196 188 180 178 178
1915 193 173 154 134 115 108 108
1925 215 183 151 119 87 68 66
1935 253 204 154 105 56 21 14
1945 298 228 157 87 17 -41 -54
1955 357 266 174 83 -8 -95 -117
1965 420 293 165 38 - 89 - 216 -252
(e) Unmarr ied women
1905 275 267 260 252 245 242 242
1915 271 252 232 212 193 186 186
1925 311 279 246 214 182 163 161
1935 369 320 271 222 173 137 130
1945 439 369 299 229 159 101 88
1955 530 438 347 256 165 78 58
1965 630 503 376 249 122 -5 -41
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Table C2
Variant A. subvariant a.
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Income
























































































































































.a is the number of years that a person has worked more than ( +) or less than ( -)
the ligure in the base variant.
b l is the deviation from the mean life expectancy (men).
b1 is the deviation from the mean life expectancy (women) .
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Table C3
Variant B, subvariant a.
Income













































































































































































a is the number of years that a person has worked more than (+) or less than (-)
the figure in the base variant.
b, is the deviation from the mean life expectancy (men).
b2 is the deviation from the mean life expectancy (women) .
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